423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the wadi after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
619 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict,
648 and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins, this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and even greater problems.

674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
[682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
[829] the full diiya, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused said: "I did not take anything."

634 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report
554 the presence of any fugitive or criminal in his district and report
657 crimes occurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal segment he represents.

634 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve
554 any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are con-
657 sidered a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore,
562 there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons
701 away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields,
178 Awlad Ali look at military service as

1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed payment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities
[233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individuals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shepherd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an
[183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostilities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its
[464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the government projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find. Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties
554 is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But
657 even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all
674 minor crimes committed against property or person as well as all civil disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

634 which result in permanent bodily harm. Reporting such cases is a fairly
554 minor proceeding since such cases come to the knowledge of the authori-
657
674 ties through other channels, mainly from talks involved in the mediation
[743] for the bloodmoney or from the hospital to which serious assault cases are usually taken. Besides, reporting a crime does not mean convicting the offender. This latter depends on evidence which, in case the dispute has been settled by tribal proceedings, is hard for the police authorities to find.

634 While the government demands do not impose serious conflicts of
554 loyalty on the part of the omda, if successful, his position with the
657 government can bring to his tribal segments great benefits. These benefits are usually in the form of various social and economic aids including fodder for the animals and food and clothing for the people during the dry years. Other benefits including providing the tribal population with olive trees and helping them clear many of the old Roman wells and establishing wind mills for nominal fees. Not everyone in the area can have such benefits. Some do not even know they exist. A successful omda could manipulate the administration to get as many benefits for
[871] his tribal segment as possible.. Some successful omdas were able to have
[474] the government build schools in their districts, establish cooperative units to market local products such as wool, sheep, and olive oil.

634 This should not lead us, however, to conclude that the position of
554 the omda in the Western Desert does not involve any kind of conflicting
657 loyalty or that he is always supported by his people or even trusted by
578 them. One informant said that the omda of his biat is "...government man, not ours....He would sell us all if this pleases his masters in the

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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121 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the
613 consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection
562 renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that
114 lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut
121 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that
613 precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling, as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules.
[582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin, jural rules rarely appear in their ' pure ' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form. The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted by, say, matrilaterality, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other components into position is matrilaterality with agnation as a disturbing element. In reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilaterality, but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

121 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilaterality
613 are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group
682 marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill
674 a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide
829 did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to
[602] assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth
[604] degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother, for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristically easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking with them, and that to

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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121 613 682 674 829 604 121 613 604 [554] [582] [584] [429] [422] [583] 121 613 606 121 613

kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely permissive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma. The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say, that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian, and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important, that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

reason in three families of one tribe paying together, while the fourth is independent. Sometimes this is caused by geographical separation, at other times by personal animosity or jealousy.

The main difference between the rules of the Western Desert and Sinai is that in the West reprisals taken at the discretion of an aggrieved individual are not recognised as lawful, and are distinctly discouraged. Generally speaking, the Western Bedou is a very much more prosperous and law-abiding person than the Sinai Arab, although at the same time he retains his charm as a primitive and independent being. Occasionally a dastardly murder takes place, but public opinion is very strong not only against the murderer personally, but against all the members of his family, who automatically share his unpopularity.

In the spring of 1920 an old man, reputed to possess considerable wealth, both in camels and sheep and also in gold buried in the ground, was returning about mid-day from market riding his donkey, and one of his numerous grown-up sons was walking on foot beside him. After going four or five miles in the open desert, the old man got off his donkey, and told his son to ride for a little way while he walked. The son suddenly attacked his old father and hit him with the heavy stick he was carrying; and the poor old man died almost at once with a broken skull. There was nobody about, and the son dragged his father's body about a hundred yards, and threw it down an old dried-up cistern; then, mounting his donkey, he rode home to dinner.

That afternoon the local sheikh was told of the old man's disappearance, and as he had seen father and son leaving the market together, he had his suspicions. He traced their footsteps, picking up the tracks of a heavily laden donkey and one man walking, from near the entrance to the market place. Then, following along carefully on these tracks, he saw where the old man had dismounted. Then he saw a spot of blood and the place where the

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

682 body had been dragged. He followed the footsteps of the
• 674 son as far as the cistern, where he again saw a tiny spot of fresh blood on one of the stones. From that point donkey-tracks led straight to the son's tent.

By nightfall the son was securely lodged in the police post; and local public opinion was seething with fury, firstly at such a dastardly deed committed presumably for the sake of the old man's money, and secondly because it reflected untold discredit on the rest of the tribe. The murderer, who was a big powerful man of about thirty standing nearly six feet in height, lay in prison awaiting trial. After a few days he was admitted to hospital, where he completely collapsed and died of fright a fortnight later.

[203] Rumours then began to spread that possibly the murderer had only acted in accordance with the wishes of his brothers, who were all conspiring to get rid of the old man, in order that they might share out his possessions. This could not be proved, and appeared unlikely from the [626] evidence. However, public feeling against the whole family ran so high that it was feared that more horrors might follow; but although no open action was taken against the family, no opportunity was missed of having a dig at them in some way or another.

682 A very wealthy sheep merchant, who was a distant
674 connection of the family, and heartily ashamed of them,
691 brought an action for debt against one of the murderer's
626 brothers. He produced an I.O.U. for £2 dated twelve
686 years before and signed by the murdered man, claiming (according to custom) that the son now in court as de-
[672] fendant had inherited his father's liabilities together with his assets.

This sheep merchant was known personally to the writer, who was also aware that a month previously he had made a profit of £900 on a very clever bit of dealing in the West. The collection, after an interval of twelve years, of this paltry debt of £2, owing from the deceased father

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of the present defendant seemed—for a really wealthy man—to be pointless and futile. The merchant anticipated this objection by hastening to add that the receipt of the actual cash did not interest him in the least; but that he had been wondering how he could shew his disapproval of the defendant's family in some way, and had gone carefully through all his old papers and receipts with this end in view, and had triumphantly discovered the bill of debt now produced in court.

Bedouin Law and custom sometimes accept right to bloodmoney in all sorts of circumstances, when other law would recognise no claim. For example, the principle is accepted that a life lost in prison must be paid for by the informers whose information resulted in the imprisonment of the deceased. It is entirely immaterial whether the information so given to the police was wilfully false or intentionally misleading, or whether it was merely subsequently found to be incorrect. Even if the information had been true and correct in every detail, the informer is still blood-guilty from the Ourfi standpoint, although in actual practice any such claims for bloodmoney would probably be considerably modified.

Other claims for bloodmoney are also recognised occasionally, in cases of obvious accidental death, or death by misadventure or Act of God, when the interpreters of Bedouin Law cannot get away from the main principle that a life lost must be paid for. The difficulty in these cases is to determine who shall pay for it; and the lawsuits usually end in a clever compromise, in which their essential principles are duly observed, but their judgments are mitigated and modified by leniency and commonsense. The following example, which occurred recently in Mariut, will illustrate this.

A certain Arab called Ali Abu Bukr had inherited from his father large cultivation rights in the desert; and in the middle of this land was an old cistern for the collection of rain water. It had not been used for years, and was silted